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Abstract
Background: Private outlets are the main suppliers of uncomplicated malaria treatment in Africa.
However, they are so numerous that they are difficult for governments to influence and regulate.
This study's objective was to evaluate a low-cost outreach education (vendor-to-vendor)
programme to improve the private sector's compliance with malaria guidelines in Bungoma district,
Kenya. The cornerstone of the programme was the district's training of 73 wholesalers who were
equipped with customized job aids for distribution to small retailers.
Methods: Six months after training the wholesalers, the programme was evaluated using mystery
shoppers. The shoppers posed as caretakers of sick children needing medication at 252 drug
outlets. Afterwards, supervisors assessed the outlets' knowledge, drug stocks, and prices.
Results: The intervention seems to have had a significant impact on stocking patterns, malaria
knowledge and prescribing practices of shops/kiosks, but not consistently on other types of outlets.
About 32% of shops receiving job aids prescribed to mystery shoppers the approved first-line drug,
sulfadoxine-pyremethamine, as compared to only 3% of the control shops. In the first six months,
it is estimated that 500 outlets were reached, at a cost of about $8000.
Conclusions: Changing private sector knowledge and practices is widely acknowledged to be slow
and difficult. The vendor-to-vendor programme seems a feasible district-level strategy for achieving
significant improvements in knowledge and practices of shops/kiosks. However, alternate strategies
will be needed to influence pharmacies and clinics. Overall, the impact will be only moderate unless
national policies and programmes are also introduced.
Introduction
Malaria is a major public health problem, killing at least
one million people each year, mostly in sub-Saharan
Africa [1]. Current strategies to combat malaria, led by the
World Health Organization's "Roll Back Malaria" initia-
tive, include early and effective treatment [2]. This strategy
is hampered by ambiguous symptoms that delay recogni-
tion of malaria, inaccessibility of health facilities, and the
lack of universally efficacious and inexpensive drugs.
Treatment is further compromised by the widespread use
of anti-malarial drugs for all fevers and by incorrect dos-
ing. These factors contribute to drug resistance, which
necessitates continual change in malaria treatment
guidelines.
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In regions of sub-Saharan Africa where malaria is endemic
and public health facilities are not very accessible, about
50% to 80% of people first visit private drug outlets or
practitioners for malaria treatment [3–5]. Unfortunately,
the level of technical knowledge of private clinics, phar-
macies and shops is often low [6,7]. Because private out-
lets are so numerous and are often unregistered, they are
outside of most governments' capacity to inform, update,
monitor and regulate.
Monitoring and influencing the quality of private services
is now recognized as a key component of effective malaria
treatment [8]. However, as noted by a WHO Study Group,
achieving rational prescribing in the private sector is
"notoriously difficult" due to influences from patient
demand, drug advertising and profit margins [6]. Even
communicating new standards of diagnosis and treatment
to private practitioners in developing countries poses
immense challenges to governments with limited
resources. Innovative approaches are needed to achieve
higher quality private services without increasing signifi-
cantly the burden or cost to governments.
Objective of the study
The purpose of this study was to test whether a low-cost
outreach education programme, managed by a district
health management team (DHMT) in a rural district of
Kenya, could increase private drug outlets' knowledge of
and compliance with national malaria treatment guide-
lines. The cornerstone of the programme was to train and
equip drug wholesalers – both mobile drug vendors and
wholesale counter attendants – to serve as unpaid out-
reach educators of the new malaria guidelines. Since the
wholesalers were to educate the drug retailers during their
normal business interactions with them, the programme
was called "vendor-to-vendor." Retailers consisted of
shops, kiosks, pharmacies and private clinics, many of
them unlicensed.
Study setting
In Kenya, approximately 26,000 children die each year
from malaria, or about 72 per day [9]. In August 1998 the
Government of Kenya changed its first-line anti-malarial
treatment from chloroquine to sulfadoxine-pyrimeth-
amine (SP) [10]. Amodiaquine was to be the second-line
drug. A gazette notice in October 1999 permitted SP to be
sold over the counter and required that chloroquine be
sold only by prescription. (Amodiaquine was not men-
tioned, so it continued to be sold over the counter.) In
1999 the Government of Kenya also conducted tests of 33
SP brands and approved five. However, because of lack of
enforcement, the 28 unapproved SP drugs still remained
in the market, as well as chloroquine and amodiaquine.
Furthermore, the gazette notice was not well-publicized,
so many shops and kiosks still believed that they were
prohibited from selling SP.
Bungoma district, located in Western Province, Kenya, is a
malaria endemic area with a population of about 900,000
[11]. Home treatment of malaria, using drugs purchased
from private outlets, is common. A 1996 study found that
47% of children received home treatment with an anti-
malarial drug, purchased mainly from pharmacies (54%)
or small shops (29%) [5]. A 1998 survey conducted by the
Bungoma DHMT estimated the district had about 1500
private drug outlets (as compared to 38 health facilities).
The survey revealed that 87% of the shopkeepers had
never received training on drug use, but 60% gave their
customers some instruction on dosages. Nearly 27% did
not know the difference between anti-malarials and anti-
pyretics [11].
Description of the programme
The main components of the vendor-to-vendor pro-
gramme were: design and production of a shopkeeper job
aid and a client awareness aid, orientation of wholesale
owners, training and equipping of mobile vendors and
wholesale counter attendants, and monitoring.
With the assistance of the USAID-funded Quality Assur-
ance Project and the African Medical Research and Educa-
tion Foundation, members of the Bungoma DHMT first
conducted focus groups and individual interviews with
private drug outlets, wholesalers, and consumers. They
learned the common misperceptions the public had
about SP (e.g., that it is "too strong" for children below
one year of age), and the main difficulties faced by drug
sellers (e.g., when consumers demand anti-malarial drugs
of doubtful efficacy). The team then worked with a Ken-
yan graphic artist to develop two posters in Kiswahili to
communicate Kenya's new malaria guidelines to retailers
and to motivate the public to purchase the approved SP
drugs.
• The shopkeeper job aid was for a retailer to consult
when selling anti-malarial drugs. It was to be hung where
the retailer could easily use it when serving clients. The job
aid listed the clinical symptoms of malaria, a dosage chart
of the approved brands of SP and anti-pyretics, treatment
advice, and common situations faced by private outlets
with suggestions on how to deal with them.
• The client awareness poster was to be hung near the
entrance of the outlet to generate consumer demand for
the five approved brands of SP and to communicate that
SP was now available over the counter. It urged customers
to treat malaria properly by using one of these recom-
mended drugs which were depicted in their actual
packaging.Malaria Journal 2003, 2 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/2/1/10
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The DHMT next conducted two three-hour orientation
sessions for owners of wholesale shops and pharmacies to
gain their cooperation. Following these sessions, virtually
all agreed to send their counter attendants to the training
and let them distribute the job aids and posters during
their work.
In April-May 2000, the DHMT conducted five one-day
training sessions for mobile vendors and wholesale coun-
ter attendants. Mobile vendors are entrepreneurs who
purchase drugs from wholesale general shops (not whole-
sale pharmacies) and re-sell them by motorcycle or bicy-
cle to small retailers; wholesale counter attendants are
stationary employees of wholesale pharmacies or general
shops who are paid a daily wage. Of approximately 105
wholesalers identified, about 70% were trained: 22
wholesale pharmacy attendants, 11 wholesale shop
attendants, and 40 mobile drug vendors. Extensive role
plays were performed on how to communicate the posters
and advise outlets on where to hang them. Additionally,
each trainee received a receipt book to record recipients of
posters and to obtain their agreement to comply with the
new guidelines. Wholesalers were to discuss and distrib-
ute the job aids at the point of sale: for mobile vendors, at
the retail outlet; for wholesale attendants, at the wholesale
outlet. No retail outlets were directly trained by the
DHMT. At the end of the training, all wholesalers received
caps and shirts with the malaria dosage chart on the front.
About three months after training, the DHMT monitored
the mobile vendors and wholesale counter attendants.
During the visits, the team checked malaria knowledge
with a 10-question quiz and collected receipts. Although
the DHMT was not able to observe how the wholesalers
communicated the guidelines to the retail outlets, they
were able to confirm that the wholesalers had the requi-
site knowledge and understood every element of the
shopkeeper job aid.
The total cost of the programme that would be borne by a
district was $8300. The cost breakdown was as follows:
formative research to learn about malaria treatment issues
($2000); design and production of 1500 shopkeeper job
aids and 1500 client posters ($3000); training of mobile
vendors and wholesale counter attendants, including t-
shirts, caps and receipt books ($2800); and monitoring of
mobile vendors and wholesale counter attendants by the
DHMT ($500). These costs do not include the time spent
on this activity by district health personnel or by outside
technical advisors, but it does include daily allowances to
district personnel for the days they spent in training or
monitoring.
Methods
Research design
Six months after training the mobile vendors and whole-
sale attendants, the study team employed eight mystery
shoppers (unemployed people posing as clients) and four
supervisors (members of the DHMT) to assess the imple-
mentation and impact of the programme. The mystery
shopper evaluation approach was chosen because it has
been used effectively elsewhere to assess the quality of
drug retailers (primarily dispensing practices for diar-
rhoea and respiratory infections) without observation
bias [12]. The study team received clearance for using this
approach from the Steering Committee overseeing the
Bungoma District Malaria Initiative during their 1999
annual meeting, which included representatives from the
National Malaria Control Programme and the Ministry of
Health. Care was taken to follow ethical guidelines, such
as preserving confidentiality of individual outlets.
Data were collected for eight days. Two mystery shoppers
(one man and one woman) and one supervisor visited
each drug outlet included in the sample. The females were
to have a nine-month old child at home whom they
believed had malaria. They asked the outlet attendant for
advice on what drug to purchase. The males were to have
a two-year old child sick at home. They specifically asked
for Malaraquin (a popular brand of chloroquine). Both
types of mystery shoppers were only to provide informa-
tion (e.g., age of the child, duration of the illness, etc.) if
asked. Immediately after leaving the outlet, the shopper
discreetly completed a form to record the interaction.
Some time after both mystery shoppers visited an outlet,
a supervisor entered to check stocks, look for job aids, and
ask questions to assess malaria knowledge.
Sample design
Determining an appropriate sample design posed some
challenges. First, since the DHMT had no control over
which retail outlets were reached by the wholesalers, it
was not possible to randomize outlets into intervention
and control groups or localities. Second, because the
DHMT had conducted its own survey of private drug out-
lets in Bungoma district only two years before implement-
ing the vendor-to-vendor programme, it was reluctant to
delay launching the programme in order to allow
researchers to perform an additional baseline survey
focused on private prescribing practices.
Hence, the study team opted for a post hoc evaluation,
recognizing the limitations of this design. Because it was
not possible to randomize outlets, the researchers decided
that "informed outlets" would be defined as outlets that
had received the posters, confirmed either by the presence
of a shopkeeper job aid or the respondent stating that itMalaria Journal 2003, 2 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/2/1/10
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had been received. Outlets never having received job aids
would be defined as controls.
The study team was aware that informed and control out-
lets might differ in ways that could affect directly the out-
comes of interest. To increase internal validity, the team
sought to visit control outlets that resembled receipted
outlets in terms of location, size, and type. In addition,
during data analysis, the team examined whether the
respondent's position (employee, family member or
owner), educational level or gender could bias results.
None of these seemed to be confounders. A post hoc step-
wise logistic regression analysis found that the only varia-
ble predicting whether an outlet was labeled informed or
control was its sources of drugs (informed outlets were
more likely to report purchasing drugs from mobile ven-
dors). However, it is not known if informed and control
outlets differed in other ways not measured by the study
team, such as receptivity to being educated by a
wholesaler.
For locating informed outlets, the team started with the
231 receipts collected from wholesalers. They discarded
105 for the following reasons: 10 were duplicates; 19 were
schools or laboratories, did not have names or were out-
side the district; and 76 were in remote sub-locations.
Thus, 126 informed outlets were sought. Of these, 47
(37%) were no longer operational or could not be found,
9 (7%) had never received the job aids, and 7 (5%) were
not visited by one mystery shopper. Hence, 63 of the
receipted outlets sought were characterized as informed.
The nine which did not receive job aids were characterized
as controls.
For control outlets, the strategy was to select one to two
drug outlets near the receipted outlets, as well as 15 out-
lets from a neighbouring district (Teso). Of the approxi-
mately 200 non-receipted outlets visited, 20 (10%) did
not have anti-malarials in stock, 38 (19%) had received
job aids and were labeled informed outlets and 142
(72%) never received job aids and were labeled controls.
In all, 101 informed and 151 control outlets were
obtained.
Data analysis
Data entry and statistical analysis was conducted using
SPSS 8.0. Chi-square, ANOVA, and logistic regression
were performed to compare informed versus control out-
lets, to examine the potential impact of confounders and
to check for differences by mystery shopper scenario.
Results
Profile of private outlets, drugs and prices
Private drug outlets
More than half of the attendants at the 252 retail outlets
interviewed by supervisors were female and about 42%
were the owners (see Table 1). Nearly 25% had eight years
or less of education. About 75% of these outlets were
Table 1: Profile of respondents and outlets (in %, unless noted)
Informed outlets Control outlets All outlets signif.*
(n = 101) (n = 151) (n = 252)
Sex Female 56.4 55.0 55.6 .818
Male 43.6 45.0 44.4
Education Standard 8 or less 21.0 26.7 24.4 .542
Form 1–4 69.0 61.0 64.2
Above Form 4 10.0 12.3 11.4
Employment status Owner 44.6 39.7 41.7 .044
Employee 28.7 19.2 23.0
Family member 26.7 41.1 35.3
Locale Rural 58.4 57.6 57.9 .900
Urban 41.6 42.4 42.1
Type of outlet Shop/Kiosk 67.3 78.8 74.2 .016
Pharmacy 26.7 12.6 18.3
Clinic 5.9 8.6 7.5
Sources of drugs Wholesale pharmarcy 46.5 31.8 37.7 .018
Wholesale general 
shop
33.7 52.3 44.8 .004
Mobile vendor 31.7 11.9 19.8 .000
Malaria clients Reported average 
number of malaria cli-
ents per day
10 8 9 .161
*From Pearson chi-squareMalaria Journal 2003, 2 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/2/1/10
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shops or kiosks, and 58% were in rural areas. Outlets
reported serving nine malaria clients on average per day
(range: one to 120), of whom half were children under
five. About 20% of these outlets obtained anti-malarial
drugs from mobile vendors.
Informed and control outlets were similar in terms of sex
and education level of attendants, as well as setting.
Informed outlets were more likely to be pharmacies, but
they did not have a significantly larger clientele on average
than control outlets. Informed outlets were also more
likely to purchase their drugs from wholesale pharmacies
and mobile vendors. About 27% of informed outlets
reported getting job aids from wholesale attendants, 51%
from mobile vendors, and 22% did not know who sup-
plied them.
Drugs available
More than 70 different brands of various anti-malarial
drugs and over 30 brands of anti-pyretics were found in
the outlets visited. This represents a significant increase
from 17 brands of anti-malarials found in Kenya in 1995
[7]. On average, pharmacies had 10 different brands of
various anti-malarials in stock, while shops had two and
private clinics five. Amodiaquine (AQ), the second-line
drug, was the most frequently stocked (see Table 2). Of
outlets visited, 81% stocked AQ, while only 39% stocked
SP and 41% stocked chloroquine (CQ). Drug stocking
and source of drugs were found to differ significantly by
type of outlet. About 60% of shops/kiosks bought drugs
from wholesale general shops, which only stock over-the-
counter drugs. In contrast, almost all pharmacies/chem-
ists and private clinics obtained their drugs from large
wholesale pharmacies. Mobile vendors sold mainly to
rural shops and kiosks.
Drugs sold to mystery shoppers
Not only was AQ the most stocked anti-malarial, it was
also sold most frequently to mystery shoppers (see Table
3). SP was sold to less than 15% of mystery shoppers,
about the same proportion who were sold CQ. Mystery
shoppers were never sold injectables and very few were
sold combinations of anti-malarial drugs. About 5% of
shoppers were sold antibiotics, anti-pyretics or other
drugs as anti-malarials. Nine mystery shoppers (2%) were
sold drugs that were not genuine. In 29% of visits, the out-
let refused to sell any drug, probably due to concerns by
shopkeepers about the legality of selling drugs for young
children. Refusal to sell drugs differed significantly by
child's age and outlet type: 43% of shops versus 3% of
pharmacies would not sell anti-malarial drugs for a 9-
month old child, whereas 26% of shops versus 2% of
pharmacies would not sell for a 2-year-old child.
Whether shoppers were told the correct dose differed sig-
nificantly by type of drug. Shoppers who were sold SP
were much more likely to be told the correct dose (76%)
than those sold AQ (26%) or CQ (7%). The fact that SP is
a single dose treatment may have made it easier for
attendants to remember. Many attendants mistakenly rec-
ommended a single dose of AQ instead of the required
three-day treatment.
Drug prices
The prices paid by the mystery shoppers for treating their
child's malaria as recommended by outlet attendants var-
ied widely, from about $0.03 to $2.29. These prices
included anti-pyretics. On average, the price per tablet was
$0.10, whereas the price per bottle of syrup was $0.81.
The price within drug brands also varied. For example,
one tablet of Malaratab (the most popular AQ) ranged
Table 2: Percent of outlets having various anti-malarial drugs in stock, by programme status and type of outlet
Drugs in stock Informed outlets Control outlets All outlets Signif*
Shops/Kiosks (n = 187) CQ 22.1 42.0 34.8 .006
Informed = 68 SP 47.1 6.7 21.4 .000
Control = 119 AQ 76.5 79.0 78.1 .689
Pharmacies (n = 46) CQ 70.4 63.2 67.4 .607
Informed = 27 SP 92.6 94.7 .93.5 .772
Control = 19 AQ 92.6 94.7 93.5 .772
Private clinics (n = 19) CQ 0.0 53.8 36.8 .024
Informed = 6 SP 100.0 69.2 78.9 .126
Control = 13 AQ 83.3 69.2 73.7 .516
All outlets (n = 252) CQ 33.7 45.7 40.9 .057
Informed = 101 SP 62.4 23.2 38.9 .000
Control = 151 AQ 81.2 80.1 80.6 .836
Notes: CQ = chloroquine (to be sold by prescription only); SP = sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine (first-line drug); AQ = amodiaquine (second-line drug); 
*From Pearson chi-square.Malaria Journal 2003, 2 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/2/1/10
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from $.07 to $.21. Profit margins may provide a motive
for why AQ was sold so frequently. In general, AQ drugs
had higher profit margins than SP drugs, and syrups had
higher profit margins than tablets. Average profits for a
full child dose ranged from $.03 for Fansidar tablets (SP)
to $.34 for Malaramed syrup (AQ).
Coverage and acceptability
Coverage
During the training, about 1400 copies of each poster
were distributed to the wholesale attendants and mobile
vendors for dissemination. Based on the receipts collected
and the proportion of unreceipted informed outlets
found during the study, it is estimated that in six months
about 450 to 500 private drug outlets were reached, with
minimal effort from the DHMT.
Job aids acceptability, visibility and use
About 63% of the informed outlets were displaying the
shopkeeper job aid and the client poster at the time of the
supervisor's visit. The majority of the shopkeeper job aids
were displayed in a visible location, such as on a wall.
About 62% of retail attendants said they used the shop-
keeper job aid, and 47% believed clients used the client
poster. An indication of the usefulness of the shopkeeper
job aid was that 31% of informed outlets spontaneously
used it when asked about dosages of SP drugs.
Impact of programme
Knowledge of correct malaria treatment
During the evaluation the supervisors administered a ten-
question malaria knowledge quiz. Informed outlets
scored significantly better than control outlets on seven
out of ten questions, and slightly better or equivalent on
the rest. Informed outlets had better knowledge of impor-
tant concepts, such as that SP is not too strong for children
and that SP can be sold in shops. Among outlets that
stocked SP, 76% of informed outlets (48/63) knew the
correct dose of SP for an 18-month-old child, as compared
to 43% of controls (15/35) (chi-square = 10.9, p < .001).
A total knowledge score was calculated by assigning one
point to a correct answer and zero points for an incorrect
answer or "don't know". Informed outlets scored 8.7 (out
of 10) on average while control outlets scored 7.1.
Informed outlets receiving job aids from mobile vendors
Table 3: Drugs sold to mystery shoppers and whether told the correct dose
Anti-malarial drug Mystery shoppers who were sold the drug Mystery shoppers who were told correct dose
n( % ) n( % )
AQ-based 180 (35.7) 46 (25.5)
CQ-based 75 (14.9) 5 (6.6)
SP-based 74 (14.7) 56 (75.7)
Other* 30 (6.0) 3 (10.0)
Not sold any drug 145 (28.8) -- --
Total 504 (100.0) 110 (30.6)
Notes: AQ = amodiaquine (second-line drug); SP = sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine (first-line drug); CQ = chloroquine (to be sold by prescription only). 
*Three were sold anti-malarials (e.g. quinine). Others were sold anti-biotics or anti-pyretics.
Table 4: Malaria knowledge score* (and standard deviation) by programme status and type of outlet
Informed outlets (n = 101) Control outlets (n = 151) All outlets (n = 252) p-value**
Shop/Kiosk 8.8 7.0 7.7 .000
(1.6) (1.6) (1.9)
Pharmacy/Chemist 8.6 7.5 8.2 .000
(1.1) (1.5) (1.4)
Clinic 7.8 7.6 7.7 .685
(1.6) (1.4) (1.5)
Total 8.7 7.1 7.6 .000
(1.5) (1.6) (1.8)
*The score was based on a 10-question true/false quiz administered to each outlet, with 10 as maximum score. The questions focused malaria treat-
ment practices, such as whether sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine (SP) is more effective than chloroquine, whether SP is too strong for children, whether 
SP is a single-dose treatment, etc. **From ANOVA F-test.Malaria Journal 2003, 2 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/2/1/10
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had significantly higher scores than those receiving job
aids from wholesale attendants (9.2 vs. 8.6). Analysis by
education level revealed that, at each level, informed out-
lets scored higher. When compared by outlet type, the
intervention appears to have had a significant impact on
shops' and pharmacies' knowledge, but not private clinics
(see Table 4).
Stocking of drugs
As shown in Table 2, informed outlets were significantly
more likely to stock SP than control outlets (62% vs.
23%). Shops mainly accounted for the striking difference
in SP stocking. Overall, there was no significant difference
in stocking of AQ. Informed shops were significantly less
likely than control shops to stock CQ (22% vs. 42%), as
were informed clinics relative to control clinics (0% vs.
54%).
Dispensing practices
The key malaria dispensing practice is selling an approved
first-line anti-malarial. The Kenya National Malaria
Guidelines state that SP is the first-line drug for uncompli-
cated malaria in all age groups and should be taken with
an anti-pyretic. As shown in Table 5, the intervention
seems to have had a differential impact by outlet type. Of
those mystery shoppers who went to shops/kiosks, 32%
visiting informed outlets were sold SP, compared to only
5% at control outlets (p < .000). There was no significant
differences in the other outlet types. Among the informed
outlets, those receiving job aids from mobile vendors
were significantly more likely to sell correct drugs than
those who received aids from wholesale attendants (29%
vs. 7%).
Explicit consumer demand appeared to have an impact.
Overall, 9% of female shoppers (who did not demand
CQ) were sold a CQ-based drug, compared to 21% of
male shoppers (who did demand CQ). If more than 40%
of outlets had stocked CQ, the demand effect might have
been higher. Controls were twice as likely as informed
outlets to sell CQ-based drugs to mystery shoppers (see
Table 5).
Of all shoppers who were sold a drug, 24% (37/157) pur-
chased an approved SP and an anti-pyretic at informed
outlets, as compared to only 3% (6/202) at control out-
lets. More than twice as many mystery shoppers were told
the correct dose by informed outlets (38%) than by con-
trol outlets (15%). All told, 17% of shoppers who pur-
chased drugs at informed outlets both received an
approved drug and were told the correct dose, as com-
pared to only 2% at control outlets (p < .001).
To provide effective malaria treatment the drug seller
should ask several diagnostic questions. In comparing
informed to control outlets, 92% vs. 85% inquired about
the child's age, 50% vs. 30% asked about symptoms, and
21% vs. 11% about the duration of illness. All of these dif-
ferences were statistically significant (p < .001).
Significantly more informed outlets (24%) than control
outlets (13%) told the mystery shopper what to do if a
child's health worsens.
Discussion
In areas with a high transmission of malaria, adverse out-
comes from malaria can only be reduced if malaria symp-
toms are recognized early (within the first 12–18 hours
after onset) and sick children are treated promptly with
effective anti-malarial drugs in the right doses. Public edu-
cation campaigns on malaria symptoms and the impor-
tance of prompt and effective treatment are vital. Yet these
campaigns will be of limited value if consumers are sold
ineffective drugs in the wrong doses. For this reason,
strengthening the capacity of private drug outlets to pro-
vide the recommended anti-malarial drugs and informa-
tion is important. The challenge is to achieve greater
performance of private outlets at a cost low enough for the
activity to be scaled up nationally.
Four strategies have been advanced for improving the
practices of retail pharmacies in developing countries:
information, persuasion, incentives and coercion [13]. To
date, very few interventions to change retailer behaviours
through persuasion (or any other means) have been sys-
tematically introduced and evaluated [14]. One interven-
tion for pharmacy attendants in Kenya and Indonesia,
called "face to face educational outreach," resulted in sig-
nificant short-term improvements in diarrhoeal product
sales and communication with customers on diarrhoea
treatment [15]. Other studies have indicated that job aids
tailored to the needs of the target audience can positively
affect performance [16].
The vendor-to-vendor programme combined the strate-
gies of persuasion and customized information to achieve
improved knowledge and dispensing practices among all
private retailers. Prior research by the DHMT had revealed
that wholesalers were considered credible sources of drug
information for retailers. Hence, they were designated as
the "persuaders." Informal interviews indicated that the
mobile vendors were more enthusiastic distributors of the
job aids than were the wholesale attendants, largely
because being involved in the programme apparently
heightened their status. Also, since they were not facing
queues of retailers, communicating the guidelines was
more feasible for mobile vendors.
The main alternate model for changing shopkeeper anti-
malarial dispensing behaviours has been piloted in Kilifi,
Kenya. The model consisted of a series of three work-Malaria Journal 2003, 2 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/2/1/10
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shops, each lasting for three days, followed by a two-day
refresher training. The activity seems to have led to dra-
matic improvements in CQ prescribing practices among a
limited number of shops [17]. But due to the high turn-
over among employees and the shortlife spans of many
outlets, this model would require constant identification
and training, which could be onerous for districts. Fur-
thermore, the Kilifi approach does not involve the whole-
sale distributors, who seem to play a key role in
influencing drug purchasing and prescribing practices.
While the vendor-to-vendor programme did seem to
improve shops' knowledge and behaviour in a relatively
short time, the gap between actual and desired perform-
ance was still depressingly large. This could be due to sev-
eral factors. First, informed outlets still had stocks of old
drugs that they needed to sell. Virtually all drug outlets
operate on very limited budgets and cannot afford to dis-
card drugs that are no longer recommended. Second, con-
fusion and fear about SP were common in the district.
Many outlets still were not sure whether they were indeed
entitled to sell SP over-the-counter. Also, nearly half still
believed that SP was too strong for chldren. Third, the pro-
gramme did not address the use of AQ, which had become
extremely popular in the district due to extensive advertis-
ing, high profit margins for sellers, and an apparently
cheaper price for consumers than SP due to misleading
packaging. It seems likely that the main reason that the
programme did not significantly affect pharmacists relates
to the large profit margins on AQ syrups, which were only
available in pharmacies. For the vendor-to-vendor pro-
gramme to have a substantial rather than a limited
impact, these issues would need to be addressed.
Affordability is a critical issue for scaling up. The vendor-
to-vendor model can be considered "high quantity" (wide
coverage) and "moderate quality" (significant but limited
improvements) at low cost (about $40 per wholesale out-
let reached – including mobile vendors – and about $9–
11 per retail outlet reached). To help other districts to
launch the activity on their own, the Quality Assurance
Project has produced a comprehensive how-to manual for
Table 5: Drugs sold to mystery shoppers, by programme status and type of outlet (in %)
Drugs sold Informed outlets Control outlets All outlets Signif.*
Shop/Kiosk (n = 136)( n = 238)( n = 374) .000
SP 31.6 2.5 13.1
AQ 28.7 33.2 31.6
CQ 5.1 18.9 13.9
Other anti-malarial 0.0 0.4 0.3
Not an anti-malarial 5.9 6.7 6.4
Not sold any drug 28.7 38.2 34.8
Pharmacy/Chemist (n = 54)( n = 38)( n = 92) .352
SP 24.1 23.7 23.9
AQ 48.1 63.2 54.3
CQ 20.4 10.5 16.3
Other anti-malarial 0.0 0.0 0.0
Not an anti-malarial 5.6 0.0 3.3
Not sold any drug 1.9 2.6 2.2
Private Clinic (n = 12)( n = 26)( n = 38) .369
SP 16.7 3.8 7.9
AQ 33.3 30.8 31.6
CQ 8.3 26.9 21.1
Other anti-malarial 0.0 7.7 5.3
Not an anti-malarial 0.0 0.0 0.0
Not sold any drug 41.7 30.8 34.2
Total (n = 202) (n = 302) (n = 504) .000
SP 28.7 5.3 14.7
AQ 34.2 36.8 35.7
CQ 9.4 18.5 14.9
Other anti-malarial 0.0 1.0 0.6
Not an anti-malarial 5.4 5.3 5.3
Not sold any drug 22.3 33.1 28.8
Notes: SP = sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine (recommended first-line drug); Amodiaquine (second-line drug only); Chloroquine (not recommended, to 
be sold by prescription only); Other anti-malarial (quinine, etc.); Not an anti-malarial (anti-pyretics or anti-biotics only). *Based on Pearson chi-
square.Malaria Journal 2003, 2 http://www.malariajournal.com/content/2/1/10
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district managers interested in introducing the vendor-to-
vendor programme in their districts. (The manual can be
downloaded from the QAP website, http://
www.qaproject.org.)
It should be noted that the evaluation had some serious
limitations, mostly related to the sampling design.
Informed and control outlets might have differed in
important ways that were not measured but could affect
the outcomes presented. Informed outlets may have been
"self-selected"; i.e., control outlets may have been offered
job aids but refused them.
Another form of selection bias may have resulted from the
decision to exclude receipted outlets in remote locations
due to logistical considerations. Moreover, because out-
lets were not randomly selected, one cannot extrapolate
from the study to estimate the percent of all outlets in
Bungoma district stocking SPs or giving correct advice to
customers. Hence, additional studies of the programme
are needed to validate the findings.
Using mystery shoppers yielded important information,
but it also had some drawbacks. Mystery shoppers cannot
evaluate institutions where they would be detected as out-
siders (e.g., school dispensaries) or where they are
required to bring their child with them (e.g., some private
clinics). If the mystery shoppers had brought sick chil-
dren, private clinics probably would have dispensed more
injections. It is also possible that real clients, who are
familiar to the shopkeepers, would be refused treatment
less often than unknown clients (mystery shoppers).
Conclusions
The vendor-to-vendor programme, a low-cost outreach
education strategy, seems to have had a moderate impact
on private drug outlets' knowledge of and compliance
with malaria treatment guidelines in a rural district of
Kenya. Given the difficulty of changing private sector
practices, the DHMT found the results encouraging. Sig-
nificant differences were observed between informed and
control outlets on types and brands of drugs sold, dosages
sold, questions asked of clients, and advice given. The pro-
gramme has also had a positive impact on knowledge of
malaria treatment guidelines, especially among retail
attendants with less education. The programme appears
to have had the greatest impact on shops and kiosks.
These effects could be heightened if the programme
addressed several issues more intensively, such as build-
ing consumer demand for SP and sustaining the interest
of wholesale attendants in the activity, perhaps through
an incentive programme. (The district launched a
"neighbour-to-neighbour" programme in 2002 to raise
public awareness about correct malaria treatment.)
However, this programme will not be able to achieve a
high degree of success without national policies and
programmes addressing the profit margins of SP versus
AQ drugs, advertising and sales of unapproved drugs, the
enforcement of correct dosage labeling, and retrieval from
the market of inefficacious drugs. Moreover, the national
government needs to be more active in educating con-
sumers about the importance of early recognition and
prompt treatment for malaria, why SP is the preferred
first-line drug, and which drugs have been approved.
Coupled with these national activities, district-level ven-
dor-to-vendor programmes would probably have greater
impact.
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